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Abstract. The Power TAC simulates a smart grid energy market. In
this simulation, broker agents compete for customers on a tariff market
and trade energy on a wholesale market. It provides a platform for testing
strategies of broker agents against other strategies. In this paper we
describe the strategies of our broker agent. Amongst others, due to a
beneficial trading technique related to equilibria in continuous auctions
on the wholesale market and a strategy inspired by Tit-for-Tat in the
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game on the tariff market, our broker ended
second in the 2013 Power TAC.
1 Introduction
Variable prices for electrical energy are seen as an important prerequisite for the
development of smart grids [1]. These prices can provide an economical motiva-
tion for consumers to shift part of their loads from peak times to times where
energy is more abundant. Various mechanisms for setting prices for electricity
in the retail market are proposed [2]. The performance of these mechanisms
depends on the behaviour of self-interested actors, and they should therefore be
tested in a competitive setting.
The Power Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC) is a platform in which
agent strategies for trading energy in a smart grid setting can be tested. Com-
peting researchers create agents (referred to as ‘brokers’) that act in the retail
market for electricity. They try to maximize their profit by publishing tariffs to
attract customers and by trading on a wholesale market. After a pilot and a
demonstration in 2011 and 2012, the inaugural Power TAC was held in 2013 [3].
In this paper we present cwiBroker, a broker that was created for this com-
petition. It utilized an adaptive strategy in order to achieve the most profitable
setting for itself. Thus, the actions our broker takes depend on the actions of
other brokers. In the tariff market, we took into account the number of competi-
tors, which yielded strategies suitable for either a duopoly or an oligopoly setting.
In duopoly games, our broker uses an adaptive strategy inspired by Tit-for-Tat
in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma [4] game. In oligopoly games, our broker
aims to find the optimal tariff by estimating the profit for a set of candidate
tariffs. Furthermore, we used regression analysis to accurately make predictions
about energy prosumption. Finally, for wholesale energy we used a beneficial
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trading technique, related to equilibria in continuous auctions. The combined
set of strategies of cwiBroker resulted in a second place in the competition.
This document is organised as follows. In Sect. 2 we describe our broker’s
basic architecture and the setting in which it has to act. Next, each of the com-
ponents of our broker will be described in more detail (Sect. 3 for the tariff
market, Sect. 4 for the wholesale market, and Sect. 5 for the prosumption esti-
mator). In Sect. 6 we will analyse the performance of each component, based on
results of the 2013 Power TAC.
2 The 2013 Power Trading Agent Competition
In the Power TAC [3], a central server simulates several entities that act in
a smart grid environment. Among those entities are large generation compa-
nies (gencos), consumers (e.g. households, offices, hospitals), small producers
(e.g. owners of solar panels and wind farms), a distribution utility (DU), and a
wholesale market. Brokers that trade in this environment are created by com-
peting researchers. The brokers are tested against each other in various settings
(differing in e.g. number of players, weather conditions or customer behavior).
In the simulations, time is divided into 1-h intervals, referred to as times-
lots. Within each timeslot, demand and supply must be balanced. This means
the net amount of energy bought and sold on different markets must be zero.
Three different markets are present: a tariff market, a wholesale market and a
balancing market. On the tariff market brokers trade energy with consumers and
small producers by publishing consumption and production tariffs respectively.
Potential customers evaluate the tariffs and subscribe to the one they prefer.
On the wholesale market energy is traded in a periodic double-sided auction, in
which the brokers can trade energy ahead with each other and with the gencos.
If a broker has a real-time net imbalance, then the DU will buy or sell energy
for the broker in order to match demand and supply on the balancing market.
The rewards or penalties for imbalances depend on the imbalance of the broker,
but also on the total imbalance of all brokers. In addition to the competing bro-
kers, in every game there is a default broker, to which all customers are initially
subscribed. For a detailed description of Power TAC we refer to [3].
In the 2013 Power TAC, there were 7 participants. Each broker played six
2-player games (one against each competitor) and 20 4-player games (one for
each combination of three out of the six other players). Four games with all 7
participants were held. Each game consists of at least 1320 timeslots. After that,
there is a fixed probability that the game will end in each timeslot.
The cwiBroker. Participation in the Power TAC requires brokers to make
complex decisions. Roughly speaking, brokers have to operate on two different
markets: the tariff market and the wholesale market. The balancing market
could theoretically also be used strategically, but this is hard, and penalties
for under supply are generally higher than rewards for over supply [5]. Our
broker, called cwiBroker, therefore aims to balance its own demand and supply.
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In order to achieve this, we created a component that estimates the production
or consumption of each type of customer. Furthermore, we created separate
components for the tariff market and the wholesale market.
Although the task for each component is quite complex, their interaction is
rather straightforward. The prosumption estimator requires as input the histor-
ical data (energy usage of each type of customer and weather data). Given a
weather forecast, it predicts the production or consumption for a future timeslot
for each type of customer. This is used as input for the wholesale market compo-
nent. The latter trades on the wholesale market in order to balance the estimated
prosumption for cwiBroker and maintains, for each quantity, an expected unit
price for wholesale energy (based on historical results). This expected unit price
is used as input for the tariff market component, which uses this information to
decide which tariffs will be most profitable.
3 Tariff Market Strategy
In this section we will describe the tariff market component, which manages
the set of published tariffs. It can publish new tariffs, modify existing tariffs, or
revoke old tariffs. A tariff consists of rates, which specify a retail price that may
depend on the time of the day, day of the week, or the quantity that is consumed
or produced. A tariff may also contain features such as a periodic fee, a sign up
bonus or fee, or an early-exit fee. The number of customers that a tariff attracts,
depends on its exact specification and the alternative tariffs that are available.
The optimal strategy for trading on the tariff market depends on the behavior
of other brokers, in particular the tariffs they publish. Therefore, our broker
compares its tariffs with the tariffs of opponents. The structure of our broker’s
tariffs is kept relatively simple. It publishes at most one tariff at a time, with a
fixed-price, single-rate, no sign-up bonuses or fee’s, no early-exit bonuses, and
no periodic payments. It can therefore be represented by a single price p. We
will make some simplifications when considering the tariffs of opponents. When
opponents publish multiple tariffs, we will only consider their cheapest tariff.
This tariff is expected to be the most relevant one, since it attracts the most
customers. Furthermore, we take for any tariff only a single price, equal to the
lowest rate in the tariff. The more complex features of a tariff are ignored.
We argue that, in order to obtain high revenues, brokers should cooperate
with each other. This can be achieved if all brokers publish tariffs that are very
profitable to them, but unfavourable for customers. In this case, the brokers
each obtain a similar share of customers, and may make large revenues. How-
ever, if one broker does not cooperate, by publishing more competitive tariffs, it
will attract more customers than other brokers, which may trigger competition
between them. This competition may lead to a price war, in which tariff prices
ultimately approach the cost price for brokers. In this case it will be very hard
for brokers to make a profit. It is possible to avoid this situation if all brokers
cooperate. However, if one broker does not cooperate, this can be sufficient to
make cooperation of other brokers fail. For this reason, cooperation is more likely
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to succeed in games with fewer brokers. Therefore, we implemented different tar-
iff market strategies for duopoly games (games with two players) and oligopoly
games (with three or more players).
3.1 The Duopoly Tariff Market Strategy
In duopoly games, our broker is initially competitive, i.e. it first tries to obtain
a reasonable number of customers. However, we do not always want to price cut
our opponent, if this leads to unprofitable tariffs. Therefore, after we published
a number of competitive tariffs, we switch to a strategy in which we copy the
tariffs of the opponent. In case our opponent also no longer competes with us, we
can achieve a tacit collusion. If our opponent reacts by increasing its prices, we
also copy the higher prices. In this case both brokers may make large revenues.
In more detail, our broker publishes an initial tariff with a relatively low
price pmin, which is chosen to be higher than the estimated cost price. After
that, whenever the opponent publishes a tariff with price p′, our agent responds
by replacing its current tariff with a new tariff with price p = p′ − Δ, within
bounds [pmin, pmax]. First we choose Δ > 0, but after two times we use Δ = 0.
Intuitively, our strategy has some analogies with Tit-for-Tat (TFT) in the
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) [4]. The duopoly game is somewhat similar to
IPD, in the sense that brokers have an incentive to compete with their opponent
(the ‘Defect’ action in IPD), but their profits would be higher if both published
high-priced tariffs (the ‘Cooperate’ action in IPD). After the first few competitive
actions, our broker will copy the last action from the opponent in the rest of the
game. This is analogous to TFT.
3.2 The Oligopoly Tariff Market Strategy
We will now describe our broker’s tariff market strategy in oligopoly games. In
oligopoly games, a cooperative strategy is less likely to succeed than in duopoly
games, so in these games our broker plays a more competitive strategy. Our
broker considers a set of tariff prices and estimates for each price p in this set
how much profit it would make if it published a tariff this price. It then publishes
the most profitable one. Our broker computes an estimation ˆTP (p) of the profit
it would make if it published a tariff with retail price p:
ˆTP (p) = (p − pˆcost)
∑
c∈C
Nˆc(p)qˆc (1)
where C is the set of customer types and pˆcost is the estimated cost price of
energy. qˆc is the estimated prosumption per customer of type c, computed by the
prosumption estimator (see Sect. 5). Nˆc(p) is the estimated number of customers
of type c that subscribe to a tariff with price p. It is modelled as:
Nˆc(p) = N totalc
ebp
a + ebp
(2)
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The total number of consumers N totalc of type c in the game is public informa-
tion. The parameters a and b are estimated during the game. This is done by
sequentially publishing two test tariffs with different prices p1, p2. The broker
keeps each tariff for a number of timeslots and records the number of customers
Nc,1 and Nc,2 respectively, for each customer type c. The parameters a, b are
then computed from the pairs 〈p1, Nc,1〉, 〈p2, Nc,2〉. Finally, our broker computes
ˆTP (p) for several p, and publishes a tariff with the price p that maximizes ˆTP (p).
In order to successfully estimate Nˆc(p), the other brokers must not publish
tariffs while Nc,1, Nc,2 are being measured. Furthermore, even if Nˆc(p) has been
successfully determined, the computed optimal tariff price only remains optimal
as long as other brokers publish no new tariffs. Thus, this approach only works
if the set of published tariffs remains stable. Due to the fierce competition in
oligopoly games, we expect tariff prices to reach an equilibrium quickly. There-
fore, our broker waits a period of time before it starts estimating the subscription
models. After a predetermined number of timeslots K1, it publishes a compet-
itive tariff with a price pinit equal to the lowest observed price of competitors.
Then, after K2 more timeslots, it will publish both test tariffs sequentially, each
for K3 timeslots. Finally, it publishes the estimated optimal tariff.
If the subscription models are inaccurate, or if the environment changes
because other brokers have published new tariffs, then the estimated optimal
tariff may not be correct (anymore). In order to escape from such situations,
our broker aims for a number of customers N of the type CentervilleHomes
within a manually chosen interval [Nmin, Nmax]. If N < Nmin, then our bro-
ker’s current tariff (with price p) is too expensive and it will be replaced by a
new tariff with a lower price p′ = p − δ. If N > Nmax, then our broker’s tariff
(with price p) is too cheap and it will be replaced by a new tariff with a higher
price p′ = p + δ. δ is chosen manually. Our broker keeps replacing tariffs as
long as N /∈ [Nmin, Nmax]. We expect that if a tariff attracts customers for type
CentervilleHomes, it is likely to attract customers of other types too.
4 The Wholesale Market Strategy
In this section we will describe the strategy played by cwiBroker on the whole-
sale market. We will first introduce the market rules and properties of other
players (in particular the gencos) and analyse the particularities of the Power
TAC wholesale market design. Next, we explain the strategies cwiBroker used
to obtain the desired amount of energy at a unit price that is most profitable.
4.1 Power TAC Wholesale Market Properties
On the Power TAC wholesale market, energy for a particular timeslot can be
traded in 24 sequential auctions (between one and 24 timeslots ahead). Brokers
can place both bids (orders to buy energy) and asks (orders to sell energy),
represented by a quantity and an optional limit price. This limit price represents
a maximum price to buy or a minimum price to sell. There is no official limit on
104 B. Liefers et al.
the number of orders a broker is allowed to submit for a single auction (although
there is a practical limit due to overhead for the server).
The market is cleared as follows. Bids are sorted in descending order of limit
price, and asks in ascending order. The orders will be cleared iteratively, as long
as the limit price of the first bid is higher than the limit price of the first ask. If
the quantities q of the cleared orders are not equal, the quantity min(qbid, qask)
will be cleared, and the remainder of either the bid or the ask will be kept for
the next iteration. If the ask price exceeds the bid price, or if there are no more
bids or asks left, this process will terminate. The market clearing price is set at
the mean of the last cleared ask price and the last cleared bid price.
Besides the orders of the brokers, the gencos send in asks for their capacity
(which is variable, determined by a mean reverting random walk around their
nominal capacity) for a fixed limit price. If a genco has already sold a part of
its capacity in previous auctions for a specific timeslot, it will send in an ask for
the remainder in the next auction, at the same limit price (which is constant for
a single genco, but varies between them).
4.2 Strategy
The particular market design chosen to represent the wholesale market in Power
TAC can be regarded as a mix between a call market and a continuous market.
Each individual market clearing is a call market, because orders of all brokers
are gathered and cleared once per timeslot. However, this process is repeated 24
times for each timeslot. Traders are thus flexible in choosing when to place their
orders, like in a continuous market.
It is not uncommon for continuous auctions to open the trading with a call
market [6]. The opening call market will yield an equilibrium price and quantity
for the specific commodity that is traded. Any possible future deviations will
be traded in the subsequent continuous auction. In the Power TAC wholesale
market, brokers should therefore try to trade their desired amounts of energy
in the first auction for each timeslot. The subsequent auctions facilitate trading
of fluctuations in demand or supply due to e.g. changes in predicted number of
customers or weather forecasts.
In contrast to this analysis, it may be tempting for brokers to start bidding at
relatively low prices in early auctions, aiming for the asks of the cheapest gencos,
instead of bidding at the equilibrium price. Our broker anticipated that this
strategy, or similar variants, would be dominant among competitors. However,
such strategies expose an opportunity for other brokers to make a profit by
reselling energy, as we will explain below.
The Wholesale Bidding Strategy of cwiBroker. As a reference to the
clearing process in the first auction for a specific timeslot we include Fig. 1a.
Here the green lines (with open diamonds) indicate asks, sent in by the gencos,
and the red lines (with closed circles) represent bids. The market clears at the
intersection, where the limit prices of the asks and bids meet.
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Fig. 1. (a) Our main bidding strategy. The green lines (with open diamonds) represent
the asks of the gencos (subscripted with their names). In the first auction, we place a
bid (cwiBroker’s first bid) for a quantity Qtotal. The limit price of our bid, pb, is chosen
just above the limit price of the last genco that has to operate fully to meet this demand
(in this case nsp2b). When selling energy in future auctions, we ask a limit price, pa,
just below the next cheapest genco (gas1). The net price we pay is represented by the
red area minus the green area. (b) Sending in multiple bids (red lines with circles).
Compare the left situation (ordinary), to the right (including multiple bids). Due to
the additional bids, the clearing price will be lower without otherwise influencing the
outcome of the auction (Color figure online).
The first step in our bidding strategy is to estimate the equilibrium price
and equilibrium quantity for the particular timeslot. Therefore, we estimate how
much energy is going to be needed to fulfil the needs of all customers present in
the tariff market (irrespective of their subscriptions). For this quantity, denoted
Qtotal, we depend on the prosumption estimator (see Sect. 5). If all wholesale
energy were to be traded in a single auction, then the equilibrium would be set
at Qtotal, at the price level of the genco’s ask that intersects with this quantity
(the point labelled ‘Eq’ in Fig. 1a). We expect that any energy that can be
obtained below this price, can be resold in future auctions at a higher price.
Therefore, in the first auction our broker makes a bid for Qtotal. However, the
limit price will not be chosen at the equilibrium price, but below it. We choose
our limit price (pb) just above the limit price of the second last genco that sells
energy at the equilibrium. This is the last genco that has to operate fully to
meet the demand of Qtotal. In the situation in Fig. 1a, this is genco ‘nsp2b’.
The actual energy obtained in the first auction is denoted Q1. It is possible
that Q1 is larger than the energy needed to meet the total demand of the cus-
tomers of cwiBroker (denoted Qcwi). In this case, the difference (Q1 −Qcwi) can
be sold again in the 23 remaining auctions for this timeslot. For these auctions,
the gencos from whom we have bought power in the first auction will no longer
submit asks. Therefore, if we set the limit price of our asks, pa, to just below the
limit price of the next cheapest genco (at the estimated equilibrium price), this
will be the lowest ask price. It will however be higher than the price we paid for it
ourselves (pa > pb). If other brokers then want to buy wholesale power, they will
have to bid at a limit price of at least pa. The difference in unit price (pa − pb),
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multiplied by (Q1 − Qcwi) is the revenue for our broker. This is represented by
the green (hatched) area in Fig. 1a. The red (filled) area represents our costs. In
some cases, the green area may become larger than the red area, and thus it is
possible to make a net profit on the wholesale market, even when buying energy.
This is indicated by a negative unit price.
Summarizing, we derive benefit from the opportunity to buy energy below
the equilibrium price in the first auction. In the remaining auctions, we try to
earn back some of our investments by sending in asks at the equilibrium price. If
we do not succeed in buying enough energy in the first auction, we fall back to
another strategy. This other strategy is to simply look at the orderbook (the set
of uncleared orders of the previous auction) and bid for more energy just above
the limit price of the last uncleared ask.
Our main strategy, described above, can easily be countered by other brokers.
The other brokers could for example mimic our strategy. If they also bid on large
quantities in the first auction, but at a slightly higher limit price, their bids will
get cleared, and ours rejected. To solve this, we could, in turn, raise our limit
price slightly above the competitor’s price. However, at a certain point we will
reach the price level of the next cheapest genco. Above this price level, our broker
risks buying more energy than it can ultimately sell again, because now both
our bid and the competitor’s bid may be accepted. In fact, at this point we will
have reached the equilibrium price and quantity. We conclude that our strategy
can only fare well in the absence of competition in the first auction.
Multiple Orders per Auction. We note that there is no limit on the number
of orders brokers can submit for a single auction. It can be advantageous to send
in multiple orders, as we will explain below. If we send in bids, we want the
market clearing price to be as low as possible, and if we send in asks, we want it
to be as high as possible. Suppose we want to buy an amount q, at limit price p.
We then send in the usual bid (q, p), but now we also send in a few other bids,
with a very small quantity, and each with a slightly lower unit price. So we send
in the following bids as well:
{(q, p − iΔp) | i ∈ {1, ..., N}} (3)
where q = 2−1074 (the lowest possible value for a double in Java), for some Δp
and some N . We used N = 8, not too high in order to limit overhead for the
server. Δp was calculated from p and N such that it would yield reasonable step
sizes. If our original bid is cleared, it is likely that some of these additional bids
will get cleared too, up to the last one with a limit price much closer to the
highest ask price (see Fig. 1b). Effectively, we make sure the clearing price is as
close as possible to the limit price of the last cleared ask. Note that this only
works if the intersection of asks and bids occurs such that the last cleared ask
(rather than the last cleared bid) is partially executed. Similarly, when selling
energy, it can be advantageous to send in multiple asks, in order to raise the
clearing price to a value as close as possible to the last cleared bid.
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5 Prosumption Estimator
In order to make optimal decisions broker agents must be able to predict the total
portfolio prosumption of a timeslot. This is the portfolio production minus the
portfolio consumption. Our broker computes the estimation Qˆt of the portfolio
prosumption in timeslot t in the following way:
Qˆt =
∑
c∈C
∑
τ∈T
n(c, τ)qˆc,h(t)(temp(t)) (4)
C is the set of customer types, T is the set of tariffs published by our broker,
n(c, τ) is the number of customers of type c subscribed to tariff τ , and temp(t) is
the predicted temperature in timeslot t. h(t) is the hour of the week of timeslot
t, which is composed of the hour of the day (0–23) and the day of the week
(weekday, saturday, sunday). The predicted prosumption qˆc,h(x) per customer
of type c, for hour of the week h, and temperature x is given by
qˆc,h(x) = ac,h + bc,hx (5)
After every timeslot t, the parameters ac,h, bc,h for hour of the week h = h(t)
and all customer types c are updated using the data observed so far. First, the
observed prosumption per customer for each type c and the observed tempera-
ture are added to the data. Then, a least squares fit is performed on the data
to compute ac,h and bc,h. In the Power TAC in 2013 the prosumption estimator
only used temperature as a predictor, but in future versions we will incorporate
other weather conditions as well.
6 Tournament 2013 Results
Our broker ended second out of seven participants in the competition. It obtained
the highest score in each of the 7-player games and in five of the six 2-player
games it played. In the 4-player games, cwiBroker always had a decent score (six
times 1st, 11 times 2nd, three times 3rd). Furthermore, cwiBroker had a positive
score in all games except one (the 4-player game with game number 120, where
all players had a negative score). See Table 1 for the scores of all brokers in each
setting.
6.1 Tariff Market
In duopoly games we played a strategy that copied the opponent’s tariffs. A nice
example of where it was profitable to do this, is the game against INAOEBro-
ker02. This broker did not obtain large market shares in games against other
brokers (see Table 2), because its tariffs were not very competitive. Although our
broker obtained a market share of only 0.47, our profit against INAOEBroker02
was much larger than any other broker, even though they obtained market shares
of at least 0.89.
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Table 1. Total scores per category per broker. The normalized values represent the
z-scores. The total normalized scores define the competition results.
Broker Score Normalized
7-player 4-player 2-player 7-player 4-player 2-player total
TacTex −705, 248 13,493,825 17,853,189 0.386 0.449 0.691 1.526
cwiBroker 647,400 12,197,772 13,476,434 0.437 0.442 0.536 1.415
MLLBroker 8,533 3,305,131 12,796,064 0.413 0.391 0.395 1.199
CrocodileAgent −361, 939 1,592,764 8,336,061 0.399 0.381 0.311 1.091
AstonTAC 345,300 5,977,354 5,484,780 0.425 0.406 0.254 1.086
Mertacor −621, 040 1,279,380 4,919,087 0.389 0.380 0.234 1.003
INAOEBroker02 −76, 112, 159 −497, 131, 383 −70, 255, 037 −2.449 −2.449 −2.421 −7.319
Table 2. The market share of each broker in duopoly games. Market share is calculated
as the normalised net consumption of a broker’s portfolio (negative numbers indicate
net production of a brokers customers). The final column represents the mean (±
standard-deviation) of the market share of a broker.
Aston Croc cwi INAOE Mert MLL Tex μ ± σ
AstonTAC - 0.95 0.98 0.89 1.03 0.99 0.66 0.78±0.37
CrocodileAgent 0.24 - 0.54 1.18 0.77 0.00 0.26 0.43±0.43
cwiBroker 0.02 0.46 - 0.47 0.89 0.71 0.00 0.36±0.36
INAOEBroker02 0.11 -0.18 0.53 - 0.01 0.10 -0.15 0.06±0.24
Mertacor 0.18 0.36 0.11 0.98 - 0.77 0.09 0.36±0.38
MLLBroker 0.01 1.00 0.29 0.90 0.23 - 0.00 0.35±0.43
TacTex 0.52 0.95 1.00 1.15 1.09 1.00 - 0.82±0.41
In the games against AstonTAC and TacTex, our broker did not attract
many customers, because their strategies were too competitive. TacTex was able
to benefit from this. AstonTAC however, was unable to make a profit, although
it had almost all customers.
In oligopoly games, our broker attempted to estimate the optimal tariff price
using subscription models. In most games, however, our broker overestimated the
number of subscriptions of its tariffs. As a result, the estimated optimal tariffs
were too expensive. Fortunately, the back-up strategy (decreasing the tariff price,
until customers subscribed to the tariff) ensured we still had some customers in
these games.
6.2 Wholesale Market
We analysed the results of the Power TAC wholesale market, to validate whether
our strategy was successful. We investigated how much energy every broker
bought or sold, and how much money it paid or received for this. In this section,
we will represent the aggregated outcomes of the 24 relevant auctions, for each
timeslot t and each broker b, as a total quantity Qt,b and a total cost Ct,b.
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(a) cwiBroker (b) Other brokers
Fig. 2. Results of the wholesale market for cwiBroker and other brokers (all brokers
except cwiBroker) combined. The yellow and red colors represent higher densities of
points (Color figure online).
Figure 2 shows the results for all timeslots for all games that were played
in the competition as a heat map for cwiBroker and, for comparison, also for
the other brokers. The vertical axis represents the unit price (Ct,b/Qt,b) and the
horizontal axis a market share (Qt,b/
∑
i∈B Qt,i, where B is the set of all brokers).
The market share is a normalised measure for the net amount of energy a broker
bought or sold, relative to the total of all brokers. The market share may be
negative (indicating the broker has sold energy and the combined market share
of the other brokers was positive) or larger than 1 (indicating the broker bought
energy and the combined market share of the other brokers was negative).
From the results in Fig. 2, it becomes clear that for market shares between
0 and 0.5, cwiBroker often obtained a much lower unit price than its competi-
tors. The unit prices for cwiBroker are generally below 20e/MWh, while for
other brokers this is the lower limit. Negative unit prices are also present, which
effectively means money was earned even when we had to buy energy. Further-
more, for negative market shares, the unit prices for cwiBroker are much higher
than those of other brokers. This means our broker earns more money by selling
energy than other brokers. From this we conclude that our strategy was very
successful for market shares below 0.5. This is the case when the total energy
needed by other brokers is larger than that of cwiBroker. Our resaling strategy
ensured that the other brokers had to buy part of the energy they needed from
our broker. For market shares above 0.5, there is less opportunity to make a
profit by trading in a smart way, but our broker still obtained energy at unit
prices comparable to, or lower than other brokers.
The results of the wholesale trading in the 7-player setting are of particu-
lar interest, since in this setting all brokers compete directly with each other.
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We aggregated the outcomes of all auctions for all timeslots. This yields a total
quantity and a total cost of energy on the wholesale market, per game per broker,
which can again be converted to a unit price. The net unit price for wholesale
energy of our broker ranges from 12.2 to 18.5e/MWh. This is much lower than
all other brokers, who pay at least 25.7e/MWh.
Estimated Wholesale Earnings Indicator. We are interested in the relative
importance of the wholesale market, compared to other incomes and expenses in
the competition. Therefore, we estimate for each game how much money brokers
spent on wholesale energy compared to others. For each game, we made a least
squares linear fit through the data (Qt,b, Ct,b) of all timeslots in this game, for all
brokers except one (the broker for which we built the model to compare with).
This yields coefficients a (in e/MWh) and b (in e) in a model of the average
costs C for a specific amount of wholesale energy Q for competitors:
C = aQ + b (6)
The difference between the costs according to the model and the actual costs
then indicates how much money a broker saved (or spent excessively) compared
to competitors in this game:
Eb =
∑
t∈T
(aQt,b + b − Ct,b) (7)
where Eb is an indication for the wholesale earnings (in e) of the broker com-
pared to its competitors. T is the set of all timeslots in a game. The total values
(summed over all games in a category) for each broker for each type of game
can be found in Table 3. If we compare these values with the competition results
in Table 1, we can see that a significant part of our total profit is due to our
wholesale strategy. For the 7-player games, the relative earnings in the whole-
sale market are even larger than our total profit in these games.
Table 3. An indicator for the performance of each broker in wholesale trading. The
values represent the amount of money (in e) a broker saved (or spent excessively, in
case of negative numbers) on wholesale energy, compared to competitors. The scores
represent the total amount of money for a broker for all games in a category.
Broker 2-player 4-player 7-player
AstonTAC 924,200 770,100 1,100
CrocodileAgent −1, 302, 000 −2, 001, 900 −101, 200
cwiBroker 2,456,000 4,332,600 835,700
INAOEBroker02 −3, 926, 700 −2, 176, 500 −318, 700
Mertacor −3, 675, 800 −519, 300 −20, 000
MLLBroker −1, 700, 300 −848, 100 −110, 400
TacTex 1,011,200 420,000 −1, 177, 400
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We also checked the relative advantages of sending in multiple orders for an
auction. In order to estimate how much money brokers could have saved, we
analysed the wholesale result for every auction in the competition. If the orders
in each auction are augmented with additional orders with infinitesimal small
quantities, as described in Sect. 4, the clearing price will be either higher or lower,
but the cleared quantities will remain the same. In case all submitted wholesale
orders were augmented, cwiBroker would have made less money (e502,771 less
over the entire competition), because the price at which we sold energy would
have been lower. Other brokers could have saved on average e363,494 per broker,
summed over all games. The potential benefits of this strategy are therefore not
that large, compared to the total income and expenses of brokers. It should
however be noted that this strategy is completely free of risks.
6.3 Prosumption Estimator
The prosumption estimator must predict the total portfolio prosumption as accu-
rately as possible. In order to measure its performance we define a performance
measure for the relative absolute error errrelg,t in game g for timeslot t:
errrelg,t =
|Qg,t − Qˆg,t|
Qprodg,t + Qconsg,t
(8)
Qg,t represents the actual prosumption and Qˆg,t the estimated value, one times-
lot ahead. Qprodg,t and Qconsg,t represent respectively the production and the con-
sumption of cwiBroker’s customers (such that Qg,t = Q
prod
g,t −Qconsg,t ). We divide
by the sum of production and consumption, rather than their difference, because
we are interested in the error relative to the size of our total portfolio, rather
than to the net consumption. Additionally, in case Qprodg,t and Qconsg,t have similar
values, we would otherwise risk dividing by zero.
Note that errrelg,t for a single timeslot t typically decreases during a game,
because the prosumption estimator improves its model by learning from the game
data. We are not only interested in its performance at the end of the game, though,
as a prosumption estimator must perform well during the entire game. Therefore,
we computed errrelg for an entire game g as the mean of the relative prosumption
errors errrelg,t over all timeslots in game g. Over the entire competition, the mean
of errrelg (± standard-deviation) is 0.131 ± 0.053.
Our prosumption estimator used temperature as a predictor. However, pro-
duction depends on cloud cover, wind speed, and wind direction, rather than
temperature. We had not yet implemented this in the 2013 competition, but we
expect that it could have improved our prosumption estimator even further. In
order to analyse this, we also tested our prosumption estimator offline. In this
experiment we ran 30 simulations, in which we applied three different prosump-
tion estimators to the same portfolio. As a benchmark we used the prosumption
estimator of the sample broker [7], which is delivered as part of the Power TAC
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platform. Furthermore, we used the prosumption estimator from the 2013 compe-
tition, and an improved version, which used cloud cover and wind speed instead
of temperature as predictors for solar and wind energy respectively.
We computed the relative prosumption estimation error errrelg for each pro-
sumption estimator. The means (± sd) are 0.151 ± 0.037 for the sample broker,
0.107 ± 0.029 for the 2013 version, and 0.089 ± 0.021 for the improved version.
In each simulation, the 2013 prosumption estimator was better than the sample
broker’s, and the improved version was never worse than the 2013 version.
7 Conclusion
We developed cwiBroker for the 2013 Power TAC.
The duopoly tariff market strategy was inspired by TFT in the IPD game,
which generally resulted in good performance. Unfortunately, the oligopoly tariff-
market strategy was often not able to reliably predict the optimal tariff to pub-
lish, and resulted in tariffs that were too expensive to attract any customers.
However, the back-up strategy of decreasing our tariff price until a satisfactory
number of customers was obtained solved this issue to some degree.
On the wholesale market, cwiBroker was able to buy energy for bargain prices
in the first auction for each timeslot. In most cases, it was able to sell the surplus
of energy in later auctions for a higher price. The result was that our broker was
able to make significant profits, by trading on the wholesale market. From the
7-player games we can conclude that, when competition on the tariff market is
fierce, it is essential to have a good wholesale strategy. We achieved the highest
scores in each of the 7-player games, where it was very hard to earn money on
the tariff market. Our wholesale strategy ensured we still made a net profit.
Finally, our broker was able to accurately predict the prosumption of its
customers. This was essential input for our wholesale strategy, and in the esti-
mation of the profitability of tariffs that our broker considered. The combined
set of strategies resulted in a versatile and robust broker, that performed very
well in all settings that were tested, and ended second overall in the competition.
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